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Televised political debates, especially in races for higher office, are common in 
the United States. Debates are not constitutionally required.' but voters expect to see 
candidates tested against each other.1 Technology has changed the way political 
campaigns are conducted with television playing an ever more important role. If a 
televised debate take place, who has a right to participate? If a private television station 
or organization3 sponsors the debate, it is governed only by legislation.4 However, if the 
debate is sponsored by a public television station, the United States Constitution, 
specifically the freedom of speech clause of the First Amendment, may apply.! The case 
of Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Ralph P. Forbes confronts this issue. 
IL TheStory 
Ralph Forbes, a self-proclaimed Christian Supremacist, member of the American 
Nazi Party, and speaker at Klan callies, collected the signatures of more than 2,000 voters 
from an Arkansas congressional district in 1992.6 He thereby qualified to be on the ballot 
for his run as an independent candidate for a seat in the House of Representatives as an 
independent candidate. The five-station Arkansas Educational Television Network 
{AETN), owned by the Arkansas Educational Television Commission (ABTC), 
sponsored a series of one-hour candidates debates, but only invited the Democratic and 
Republican candidates' to participate. Forbes asked to be included, but was refused.7 
AETC based its decisions on its judgment that be was not a "viable" candidate or 
"newsworthy''.8 Forbes sued the AETC, but the District Court Decided against bim9 and 
he did not participate in the debate. 
In the election, Forbes won 2.5 percent of the vote. The winning margin was 3 
percent.1° Forbes appealed the District Court decision and, in August 1996, the Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found for Forbes on First Amendment grounds.11 The 
United States Supreme Court decided the case in 1998.12 
* Associate Professor of Legal Studies, Lubin School of Business, Pace University 
22 
II. Freedom of Speech 
The United States Constitution governs when state state action is involved.13 A 
public station is a state actor, so the constitution applies here. Forbes and the 
AETC argued the case on First Amendment grounds. 
Several freedom of speech issues are raised by this case. Why protect speech? Is 
freedom of speech absolute? If not, how much legal protection does free speech get? Is 
all speech treated alike or are some kinds of speech entitled to greater protection? If so, 
how much? 
Concerning political debates, do all candidates for political office have a legal 
right to be included in all political debates for that office? What if the candidate has 
qualified to be on the ballot? Are only the two major parties entitled to debate? Do the 
politics of the candidates matter? Do the prelinllnary polls, that is, the projected support 
at election time matter? Does money raised by a candidate matter? If minority 
candidates are kept out of debates does that constitute unconstitutional censorship? If a 
candidate's viewpoints are considered reprehensible do they have less of a right to speak? 
What if a third party candidate is ahead in the polls of one of the two major party 
candidates?'4 Does the forum matter, that is, if the debate is in print, radio, television. or 
the Internet? 
Does the issue of political debates on public television also concern freedom of 
the press? The freedom of speech clause of the First Amendment states that "Congress 
shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech .... " 15 But the First Amendment 
also bas a freedom of the press component, "Congress shall make no law .. _ abridging the 
freedom ... of the press ... ''?16 Does the press have a protected freedom to hold debates 
between candidates of its choice? Is that freedom more restricted if the press is public? 
Is television "the press"? If there a conflict between the candidate's freedom of speech 
and the press's freedom of the press17 how is it resolved? These are questions that the 
Supreme Court chose not to discuss. Rather, it spoke exclusively in freedom of speech 
terms, both for the candidate and the public television station. 
ill. First Amendment Theory 
To better understand this case, it is helpful to first consider the philosophy and 
history of the First Amendment. 
A. Absolutist vs. Codified English Law 
The freedom of speech clause of the First Amendment reads "Congress shall 
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speecli .. .. "11 On the face of it, it is 
unambiguous. Some have suggested that its appropriate reading is absolutist, that 
Congress shall make no such law. This interpretation would forbid any governmental 
restriction on speech. Then what of the passing of government military secrets to an 
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enemy?19 Or the use of the words of another Without permission'F And is this clause 
limited congressional acts or.is it extended to other legislative bodies and the executive 
and judicial branches? What of common law actions for defamation? Or shouting "Fire!" 
falsely in a crowded theater'f1 An absolutist reading would have results both too broad in 
terms of the speech allowed and too narrow in terms of the political institutions covered. 
An alternative reading is to understand the First Amendment as a codification of 
the English law of its time of the First Amendment. 22 If so, only previous restraints by 
the govemtnent would be prohibited?! However, the Supreme Court has decided that 
post-publication penalties are banned by the First Amendment.24 
B. Why Protect Speech? 
As is true of its companion amendments in the Bill of Rights, the open texture of 
the words of the First Amendment lends itself to intetpretation. Although the point is still 
debated, the prevailing jurisprudence of constitutional interpretation applauds the 
opportunity for the Constitution to develop over time,Zs rather than being restricted to the 
original intent of its authors.16 
Therefore, to determine the meaning of the First Amendment, courts have asked 
the question, "Why protect speech?" What is the objective of freedom of speech? If we 
know our objective, they suggest, we will better know how to get there. In recent cases, 
courts have considered two theories. 
Under the instrumental theory presented by Alexander Meik:eljoho, government 
restriction of speech is seen as interference with the .free flow of information preventing 
the public from making informed democratic choices.:P This interpretation focuses on the 
listener's right to listen. This is the theory reflected in the opinions of Justices Holmes 
and Brandeis promoting a free lll8Tket in ideas, As the court stated it mote recently, "It is 
of particular importance that candidates have the opportunity to make their views known 
so that the electorate may intelligently evaluate the candidates' personal qualities and 
their positions on vital public issues before choosing among them on election day."18 
The dignitary theory advanced by Tom Emerson considers self-expression to be 
an essential component of human dign.ity.211 This theory focuses on the speaker's right to 
speak, that is, on the speaker's freedom of speech, rather than the listener's freedom to 
listen. 
The instrumental theory is the more commonly used approach in First 
Amendment cases, but little is made of traditional freedom of speech theory in the Forbes 
case. The dignitary theory is not directly discussed and neither the majority nor the 
dissent consider Forbes's right to speak. There is some concern in the dissent as to 
Forbe's right to speak compared to other candidates who are pennitted to participate in 
debates. But this is a relative right to speak rather than a constitutional freedom of 
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speech. The instrumental theory seems to underlie Justice Stevens's concern m 
"government censorship and propaganda."30 
IV. Freedom of Speech Cases 
A. Holmes-Brandeis 
A Supreme Court approach to interpretation and application of the freedom of 
speech clause has developed in a series of opinions by Holmes and Brandeis. This line of 
as opinions in 1920s and was later adopted by the Supreme 
Court. It IS prenused on the understanding that freedom of speech is not absolute but 
.may be restricted by the government. However, government may not censor polltical 
speech merely because it disagrees with a speaker's viewpoint.n This is capitalist 
economic theory applied to constitutional political theory - Holmes's notion of "free 
trade in ideas."33 
Government may restrict the content of speech, but only if it has a high interest in 
the speech.34 This state interest must be compelling. For the state to act on its 
compelling interest there must also be an extremely close causal connection between the 
speech and the anticipated hatm35 such that state action is necessary. Even then, that state 
action must be drawn as narrowly as possible, the least restrictive alternative so as not to 
restrict permitted speech. In other words, government censorship is not constitutional if a 
less limiting action is possible. This judicial content based analysis of abridging of 
freedom of speech by a court is called strict scrutiny. 36 
B. Content Analysis 
The Supreme Court has made a distinction between content-based and content-
neutral governmental restrictions on freedom of speech. If the content of governmental 
the tir,ne. place, manner of speech is neutral, for example parade permit 
statutes, 1t wdl recetve a somewhat more relaxed scrutiny.' 8 
Applying First Amendment content analysis to Turner Broadcasting television 
the Supreme decided by a 5-4 majority that a content neutral regulation 
reqwnng cable comparues to carry public television stations, ''may treat categories of 
speakers differently without being labeled content-based as long as little risk exists that 
the regulation will be used to control what the speakers say."40 The distinction between 
content neutral and content based regulations is crucial to the outcome of a case. Content 
based regulations are much more likely to be found unconstitutional. 
C. Forum aassification 
The Supreme Court has developed a hierarchy of protection of speech from 
governmental restrictions based on the nature of the forum. Those forums which are 
more open to public debate receive a higher degree of judicial 
scrutiny. Forum classification was adopted over the objections of Justice Brennan who 
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would have granted strict scrutiny protection from state action to all protected speech 
regardless ofthe forum.41 
The Court classifies a forum, in order of decreasing constitutional speech 
protection, as (1) a traditional public forum, (2) a limited public forum, or (3) a non-
public forum. 
1. Traditional public forum 
A traditional public forum is a place where the public would be traditionally 
welcome to speak. In a traditional public forum abridgment of speech is pennitted only if 
it is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and if the restriction is narrowly drawn 
to achieve that end. 'This is a strict Scrutiny test. Courts will scrutinize closely the 
governmental restriction of speech and declare it constitutional only if it meets this test. 
In other words, government officials have very limited discretion to restrain the 
expression of ideas in traditionally public forums. 
Even so, if the strict scrutiny test is passed, the state may so act. In the case of 
Davis v. Massachusetts42 the United States Supreme Court followed a Massachusetts case 
opinion by A speaker on the Boston Commons was arrested for speaking 
without a permit. Holmes argued for absolute governmental power in this case. "[F]or 
the legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or 
public park is no more an infringement of the rights of a member of the public than for 
the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house.'M4 In the past century, the judicial 
trend bas been to increase the protection given to speakers. Since the Davis case, 
traditional public forwn First Amendment protection has been provided to streets, parks, 
and other public places held by govem.m.ent.45 
2. Limited public forum 
Limited public forum is a term applied to typically non-public places which serve 
as public forums for limited times or for selected classes of persons."" For those limited 
times or persons, courts apply the traditional public forum test.47 At other times or for 
persons not within the selected class, they are treated as non-public forums. Limited 
public forums include the opening of university facilities to student groups•• and a 
municipal theater made available for theater productions.49 
3. Non-public forum 
A non-public forum is neither a traditional nor a limited public forum; that is, 
neither tradition nor designation makes it a forum for public communication. so Public 
property is not a public forum simply because it is governmental. 51 An example of a non-
public forum is a public school mail system even if made available to a community 
organization. 52 
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Speech in a non-public forum is still constitutionally protected, but to a much 
lesser degree. A rational basis or reasonableness test is used here under which the state 
may regulate speech as long as that regulation is reasonable and not merely content based 
censorship, an effort to suppress views opposed by public officials. 53 Judicial review in 
these cases is much more relaxed and courts typically defer to the state. 
3. Application of Forum Classification 
Forum designation is often outcome determinative. Governmental restrictions in 
traditional public forums are much more likely to be found unconstitutional than similar 
restrictions in non-traditional public forums. Once the forum is classified, the legal 
question is whether the appropriate standard has been properly applied. 
V Forbes Case 
A . Choosing Up Sides 
The Forbes case excited many to weigh in with amicus curiae briefs. The side 
choosing has resulted in some strange bedfellows. On the side of Ralph Forbes are the 
Greens/Green Party USA,54 Perot '96,'' Eugene McCarthy, the American Civil Liberties 
Union, and the Brennan Center for Justice. 56 The Rutherford Institute paid for Forbes's 
counse1.57 On the side of AETC were the United States Justice Department, the Federal 
Communications Commission, the Commission on Presidential Debates," the 
Corporation for Public Broadcasting, the Association of America's Public Television 
Stations, 20 states, and New York City. 
B. Forum Classification 
What is the appropriate forum classification for public television sponsored 
candidates' debates? The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in this case decided that it was 
a public forum. S9 The Eleventh Circuit, in a similar case, determined that, because it "was 
stated in order for candidates to express their views on campaign issues," it was "a 
limited-purpose public forum.'.ro The Justice Department brief claimed that "Sponsorship 
by a state actor does not convert a news program into a public forum.'161 Kelly 
Shackelford, Forbes's counsel, argued "If a government-sponsored and -planned debate is 
not a limited public forum, one can only wonder what is."61 
The Supreme Court recognized the important threshold nature of this question. 
"[l]t is instructive to ask whether public forum principles apply to the case at at1."63 The 
court began to discuss the public forum doctrine, but very shortly it was discussing the 
sui generis nature of journalism in general and television broadcasting in particular and 
became uninterested in forum classification. "In the case of television broadcasting, 
however, broad rights of access for outside speakers would be antithetical, as a general 
rule, to the discretion that stations and their editorial staff must exercise to fulfill their 
journalistic purpose and statutory obligations.'164 The court emphasized the need for 
27 
deferring to the editorial discretion of broadcasters without really considering the 
constitution.65 This seems to be a case of begging the question. The majority engaged in 
scrutiny far less than strict before it had even determined the type of forum involved and, 
therefore, the appropriate level of scrutiny. 
Not surpri.singly, the court eventually decided that the political debate on public 
television was a non-public forum..66 Once this forum classification was made the end 
was in sight. 
The notion that television is not a traditional public forum seems to result from 
the adoption of a narrow definition of tradition. The public square or town hall may have 
been the traditional forum for political debate at the time of the drafting of the First 
Amendment and the Lincoln-Douglas debates67• But our political tradition evolves and 
many years have passed since the televised Kennedy-Nixon debates.61 Today, I believe, 
we would much more expect a televised debate for a congressional seat that than a non-
broadcast debate in a "traditional" public space. If we don't grant the highest 
constitutional protection to political speech broadcast on our public airways through the 
auspices of a governmental agency, I fear for the protection of all speech. 
The dissent took a step back from forum classification suggesting a more general 
issue, "whether AETC defined the contours of the debate forum with sufficient specificity 
to justify the exclusion of a ballot--qualified candidate.'o69 Although the dissent seemed 
unhappy with forum analysis, 70 it did suggest that televised political debates are most like 
parade permits.11 That would seem to imply limited-public forum analysis as with 
Ward.71 
C. Public and Private Media 
If it is all television, broadcast in the same way, why shouldn't public and private 
television be judged by the same standards?73 Isn't this case best understood as one of 
applying journalistic standards74 protected by the media's First Amendment freedom of 
speech?n 
The Eighth Circuit did make a distinction between private and public television. 
Constitutional protection is not available unless there is state action. "[A] crucial fact 
here is that the people making this judgment were not ordinary journalists: they were 
employees of the government. The First Amendment exists to protect individuals, not 
govemment."76 "A journalist employed by the government is still a government 
employee.'.n And, as the Forbes's brief argues, ''if the broadcasters are state actors, the 
First Amendment precludes them from having unfettered journalistic discretion. "78 
The Supreme Court largely ignored this distinction, treating all broadcasters, 
public and private, alike." By blurring such a distinction, the Court ignored the primacy 
of the Constitution. 80 Apparently it feared the slippery slope argument of unbridled 
speech, for it seemed unable to distinguish debate between political candidates from other 
forms ofspeech.81 
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The dissent expressed concern protection of public television presented "the risk 
of government censorship and propaganda in a way that protection of privately owned 
broadcasters does not:"1 
D. Speaker Selection 
If speaker selection is restricted by the Constitution, what are the rules? How do 
public media decide who has a right to speak: when? 
I. Traditional Candidate Test 
How important is our traditional two-party political system in this case? Should 
the candidates of the Democratic and Republican parties automatically participate in 
candidate debates and not others? After all, what chance do they have to win? u Or, as 
Perot '96 argued, is it true that "The whole point of a political campaign period is 
allow candidates - through popular appeals, organizing, and debates - to change pubhc 
opinion", not "self·petpetuating rule by Republicans and The 
found value in diversity of opinion quoting an earlier case that "political figures outstde 
the two major parties have been fertile sources of new ideas and new programs; many of 
their challenges to the status quo have in time made their was into the political 
mainstream ... as 
2. Good Faith Test 
Good faith has played a role in other constitutional law cases.'6 Should we rely on 
the good faith of the editor to determine our freedom of speech? The Court of Appeals 
argued that the good faith of the AETC is not sufficient." The question should not be one 
of faith, but of action. 
3. Content-Based Test 
Alternatively, should we use the Turner Broadcasting content-based. test, that is, 
selection is unconstitutional, but selection on other grounds may not be? 
AETC agrees that "viewpoint discrimination" is unconstitutional88 and there was no 
smoking gun in evidence rejecting Forbes because of his do we 
distinguish between keeping candidates out of a debate and keepmg mmonty '?ews from 
being How do we know whether candidate selection for a debate IS content· 
based? This standard seems far to vague for even the Supreme Court to consider. 
4. Rational Basis Test 
We are left with a rational basis test as our final altemative. But if a rational basis 
test is used, on what basis can a rational decision be made? AETC's counsel argued for a 
test of whether a candidate was "newsworthy'' enough to "best serve the interests of its 
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viewers.'si() The AETC also argued for the "political viability" test. But the AETC seems 
to have really used the traditional candidate approach because it staged entire debates 
majority when the outcome of the election was hardly in 
doubt. tnajonty parties should not be so sanguine about the results of this 
case for then may not be politically viable. The Court of Appeals 
argued a declSlon m favor of Forbes IS correct even if we assume the continuation of 
a predommantly system. ..If Mr. Forbes can be excluded today a Republican 
or Democrat who is believed to have no chance of success could' be excluded 
"Political viability is a tricky concept. We should leave it to the voters at 
the polls, and to. the judgment of nongovernmental joumalists."93 
Furth:rmore, the CircUit observed that Ralph Forbes had, in fact, earned a 
plurality of the votes tn the 1990 Arkansas Republican primary for lieutenant governor.94 
. .The Eighth Circuit said that "The question of political viability is, indeed so 
subjective, arguable, so of variation in individual opinion, as to provide no 
secure bas1s for the exerc1se of governmental power consistent witlt the First 
Amendment.''95 
. the. and the dissent in this case apparently felt that the rational 
VIabt.hty. test is the appropriate test. Where they differed, is in their 
analysts of the application of the test; that is, whether, in this case, an objective standard 
was used by AETC staff.96 As characterized by Justice Stevens the AETC decision was 
an "entirely subjective, ad hoc [judgmentJ,'>97 whereas what required was "narrow 
objective, and definite standards.'>98 ' 
E. Competing Freedom of Speech Claims 
argument raised here against Forbes is that of competing freedom of 
speech chums.. If one speaker gets more freedom of speech, another speaker necessarily 
gets less. And 1f there are too speakers no one has an opportunity to engage in meaningful 
speech. In other words, does granting freedom of speech to all deny freedom of speech to 
aU? 
that its to exclude Forbes resulted in more speech for the 
Wlth a ofwmrung.99 A13 argued by its Richard Marks in 
his If every bad a constitutional right to a,Ppear in a debate on public 
teleVIsiOn, then public broadcasters would be flooded with requests for access".1oo The 
result would be a "cacophony" and no voice would be clearly heard. 
The <:ircuit did not absolutely protect the right of minority candidates to 
be heard, but It questioned the exclusion of a candidate on the grounds used.1°1 Forbes's 
that the "effect of AETC's approach is to exclude minority voices and 
It for many voices quoting Judge Learned Hand that "right 
are likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through 
any kind of authontative selection. ••101 
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The Supreme Court, concerned at the number of candidates on some ballots, was 
persuaded by AETC argument, even adopting the "cacophony" argurnent.104 In fact, the 
court took it even a step further presenting the specter of absolute silence if the public 
broadcaster chose that a debate wasn't worth the bother.10s 
I believe that at best this is an example of an easy case making bad law. The 
perceived evil, too little speech for some, usually the majority candidates, gives more 
value to the speech of some candidates than other candidates. Perhaps \Ulequal valuation 
of speech makes sense in some cases, to enable the voter to make a decision based oo the 
speech of a limited number of And I believe that the fear of dead air 
because of too many candidates is a bogey man. Even if this might happen in some case, 
this is not the feared hard case. There were only three candidates on the ballot for this 
office and televised debates of three candidates have been held for three presidential 
candidates107 and for many more candidates in presidential primaries.108 
The court's concerns as to having toe> many speakers in a debate in which no one 
is really heard could be answered either by the dissent's argument that objective 
standards simply be established in advance of the selection of debate participants. In 
practice, this anticipated problem would probably be resolved through legislation making 
access to the ballot increasingly difficult. That raises its own constitutional issues, but 
they have apparently been resolved. 
Such an interpretation would preserve principle that not everyone has access to 
public media.1cw It might also result in movement to further limit access to the ballot by 
increasing the signature requirements for candidacy on the ballot. But decisions on those 
potential cases will be left to another day. 
Does the broadcaster have freedom of speech claims as well? The court asserted 
that "[wJhen a public broadcaster exercises editorial discretion in the selection and 
presentation of its programming, it engages in speech activity''110 wbich apparently is 
seen as at least as deserving of First Amendment protection as the political speech of a 
candidates' debate.m The court's starting point is one of lack of access to the public 
press. "[I]n most cases, the First Amendment of its own force does not compel public 
broadcasters to allow third parties access to their programming."112 Candidate debates are 
then presented as "the narrow exception to the rule" that "public broadcasting as a general 
matter does not lend itself to scrutiny under the forum doctrine."113 At first it seems 
pretty innocuous - at least debates get some scrutiny. However, by putting debates in the 
category of the exception to the rule, Forbes had to play to prove his exceptional 
rather than having burden on AETC justifY its limitation of speech. 
The dissent also accepts broad journalistic discretion, just not quite as broad as the 
majority. Its primary concern is that here there is "nearly limitless discretion.''114 It 
appears that just a little less discretion would have been fine. 
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The court, by finding freedom of speech claims for majority candidates and 
broadcasters denied freedom of speech to the only two parties who really needed it, 
Forbes and the voters. 
F. Effects of Decision 
What does the Supreme Court decision mean for political debates on public 
television?115 Perhaps it does mean that public television would be more likely to sponsor 
political debates.116 They'll certainly be able to ignore marginal candidates such as 
Forbes. They will avoid the fear that if the Court of Appeals ruling had been followed, it 
might have been extended to public television news programs.111 The concern of the 
Supreme Court seems to have been that to a constitutionally protected right to 
freedom of speech by minority party candidates is to embark on a slippery slope that may 
have repercussions far beyond candidate debates. m 
If the court had kept its eyes on the ball and decided the case before it on its 
merits, rather than being distracted by possible ramifications of its decision, it would have 
done a better job. A judicially acceptable selection standard could have been used to 
choose participating candidates. Or public television might restrict itself to covering 
"bona fide news events,''119 perhaps including broadcasts of privately sponsored political 
debates.120 
VI. Conclusion 
The United States Supreme Court decision was not a foregone conclusion. As 
Justice Kennedy stated in his opinion, the court granted a writ of certiorari for this case:, 
not only because of its constitutional and practical significance, but also because of a split 
in the Circuit Courts of Appeal. The Eleventh Circuit bad decided for a public television 
commission, the Georgia Public Telecommunications Comm.ission121 on similar facts. 
This decision does danger to the fabric of constitutional law in general and the 
First Amendment in particular. As discussed above, it blurs the line between public and 
private action, as the dissent notes122 and cheapens the value of freedom of speech by 
deciding that everyone has it, but the more powerful just have more ofit. 
But the most disappointing aspect of this case is the dissenting opinion. Even if 
the dissenting opinion121 had been adopted by the majority of the court, the impact of this 
case on constitutional law would not have been significantly different. The dissenters 
disagreed more on the application of the constitutional principles124 than on what the 
basic appropriate principles are.m The result of this particular case would have been 
different, but the bar of constitutional judicial review would have been set only a little bit 
The dissent here accepts that the forum is non-public and apparently uses the 
weakest form of judicial review available in these cases, the rational basis test Their 
question is more of whether the standards that would have been applied to a private 
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television station have been met, rather th h 
stations governed by the United States Co anti.tuw. etberh the standards for public television 
ns non s ould be 
This short · · commg IS most apparent in Ju.stice Ste¥ ' . 
opinion. Whereas RichardS. Amold, Chief Jud ens s Court of 
sweepmg statement rejecting a ''political viab T , ge of E1.ghtb Ctreutt, rnade a 
Amendment, t2a Justice Stevens referred to th 1 Ity test as consntutJonal under the First 
appraisal of 'political viability n•t29 Thi e as referring only to "the staff's 
e · al f . . · s IDJsuse of Judge Arnold' · . . qwv ent o plagtansm in that both involve fal . . s opm10n ts the 
Judge Arnold's words and Justice St , se _attnbu_ttons. The distinction between 
testing each individual candidate s IS cmcial. It is the difference between 
under the relevant legislation ofth . l'ti on the election day ballot 
a test completely. The dissent fiurutht for polttical viability and rejecting such 
, • or e case--by-case approach. 1.30 
What is perhaps most strange is that aft . . . 
governing political debates sponsored by p . b : this deCISIOn, federal legislation 
candidate's freedom of speech better tb ro casters may well protect a minority 
is receiving super-constitutional If this meant that speech 
seems to me that, instead, the protection a£fo s a on, . t would be one thing, but it 
weakening. rded agamst governmental restrictions is 
If I atn right, then the tide of constituti a1 . 
curiously turned, with the protection of co on of freedom of speech bas 
protection of political speech weakenin W speech strengthening and the 
ourselves as a capitalist economy edmust be_ careful to Primarily identify 
a emocratic republic. 
. . As time passes, the wisdom of Justice B b 
sunplification of the analysis of freed f renruut more and more clear. A 
censorship, would clarifY rights and d ti?m . 0 speech, stnctly scrutinizing government 
f · . u: es m a way that would p th · 
o protection, especial! of oli . e unportance 
clasSification followed by various r:.nns Pof and avotd complicated forum 
seems detennined to at least pay lip service th ctal But the Supreme Court 
approach. In practice, it seems to have signifi P7[e:uation the forum categorization 
labeled traditionally public, and thereb . y forums which may be 
Y penrutte further limitations on political speech. 
The First Amendment is there to prot«t th fi; ed 
.freedom needs protecting. Candidates whose li .e e . of. speech of those whose 
protection. The media, public and private tical vrabtlity IS not in doubt need no 
the of those whose voices are to broadcast their words. It is 
consntution. Political debate is how ideas se go that concern the 
fullest and most urgent a 1i . . are tested. The Fust Amendment "has its 
office."tJt It is to the of campaigns for political 
· . ocracy. J.O exclude mmority dida 
are nunonty candidates, is to silence the vo. can tes because they 
perhaps most need to, hear. tees of those we are least likely to, and 
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ENDNOTES 
1 "A state-owned broadcaster need not plan, sponsor, and conduct political debates . . .. " 
Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 3102, 
*42 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
2 When debates do not take place, for example in the 1994 New York State gubernatorial 
election between Mario Cuomo and George Pataki, people notice. No debate occurred 
because the Democratic incumbent, Mario Cuomo, insisted on allowing all candidates to 
participate, while the Republican candidate, George Pataki, insisted on a one-on-one 
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COMMERCE VIA THE INTERNET: THE FUTURE OF DOING BUSINESS 
by 
Reginia Judge • 
I. Introduction 
The Internet has revolutionized the way business is conducted, and therefore it 
has become an invaluable tool of commerce. It provides for the convenience of 
purchasing goods at home and, therefore, allows customers to save valuable time and 
money. Consumers can easily bid on merchandise through on-line auctions, perform 
price comparisons, and even print postage. They also have the ability to engage in 
financial transactions and trade stock. Because of the World Wide Web, merchants 
have been able to establish business without storefronts and service customers 
throughout the country and around the world. 58 million people in the United States 
and Canada used the Internet in 1997, a 14% increase from 1996.1 Ten million of 
those users purchased goods and services on-line.2 Retailers, such as Amazon.com, 
reported revenues at an estimated 1.4 billion dollars in 1999 from business-to-
consumer sales. 
3 
According to a recent report prepared by Penn State's Smeal College 
of Business Administration, U.S. Business-to-Business sales on the Internet are 
expected to reach $183 billion dollars in 2001.4 This lucrative method of commerce 
has allowed business organizations to reap overwhelming profits. 
Although many consumers are utilizing the Internet to make purchases and 
obtain information, there are still skeptics who have not ventured into cyberspace to 
take advantage of the services available. Often, concerns are focused on the 
protection of the right of privacy. 5 A 1998 poll published in Business Week 
indicated that 61% of those who do not use the Internet would be more likely to do so 
if they thought their personal information would be protected. 6 This article shall 
address the issues raised by the advent of electronic commerce such as privacy, 
security and consumer confidence. Also discussed will be the safeguards that can be 
utilized to address these concerns. 
II. CONSUMER CONCERNS 
A. CONFIDENTIALITY & SECURITY 
The protection of ones privacy is a priority to those ·persons purchasing goods 
via the Net. The fear of transacting business over the Internet stems from the concern 
over the use and distribution of personal information that is often required to utilize 
some web sites. Moreover, the threat of security breaks when banking transactions 
and purchases are conducted electronically fosters the need for privacy. 7 Many 
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